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RESHAPING FIRST-YEAR LEGAL DOCTRINE: THE
EXPERIENCE IN THE LAW SCHOOLS
RONALD CHESTER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

N a previous article,' Scott Alumbaugh and I attempted both to
diagnose problems with what is being taught in the first-year curriculum and to suggest how this doctrinal package could be better
structured. We suggested teaching the bulk of what now constitutes
the courses of Contracts, Torts, and Property within a single course
called Civil Obligation.2 This course would functionally rearrange
tort, property, and contract doctrine. For example, if the doctrines of
promissory estoppel in contracts, misrepresentation in torts, and
home builder's warranties in property all serve the same underlying
purpose (e.g., imposition of liability because of justified reliance),
then each would be taught as examples within the "Reliance" section
of the course. 3
In addition to Reliance, we discussed other organizing principles
such as Status, Duty, Bargain, and Excuse for Changed Circumstances, arguing that much of Contracts, Torts, and Property could
be taught more coherently in this fashion than as presently structured. 4 We also proposed placing greater emphasis on statutory and
regulatory material at the expense of traditional common law analysis,
in recognition of the growing pre-eminence of these forms of law in
the modern Regulatory State.5
As we envisioned it, teaching these "private law" courses by organizing principles would both de-mystify current doctrinal analysis 6 and
*
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1. Ronald Chester & Scott E. Alumbaugh, FunctionalizingFirst-Year Legal Education:
Toward a New PedagogicalJurisprudence,25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 21 (1991).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 54.
See id. at
See id. at
See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,

40-41 n.62.
59-70.
id. at 54.
id. at 80.
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eliminate needless redundancy, 7 thus empowering students.' At the
same time, teachers under the revised system would be better able to
experiment with new forms of classroom instruction. 9 Thus, functional organization of doctrine would make humanization of the process of legal education easier. In turn, this process would be informed
by a rigorous discussion of doctrine which uses these organizing principles to focus ultimately on questions of fairness and justice.' 0
Alumbaugh and I ended the prior article by suggesting that the
functionalizing of "private law" doctrine could eventually be expanded into other areas of the curriculum." As I currently see it, for
example, basic courses in Civil and Criminal Procedure could be
taught simply as "Procedure," and Criminal Law might be combined
with the three private law courses into a broader course than Civil
Obligation called, for example, Legal Obligation. In this last regard,
Status, Duty, Reliance, Bargain, and Excuse seem to work as well in
the Criminal Law area as in the other three courses, particularly when
2
our proposed emphasis on "public law" is included.
In upper-level courses, one might, for example design courses
around doctrinal problems peculiar to particular industries or types of
customers served by lawyers or according to a particular function
served by certain lawyers, such as tax and estate planning. Each area
identified would be taught by integration of the subject matter into
the legal construct experienced by a practicing lawyer when confronting such problems.
Sporadic attempts at a similar reorganization of upper-level curricula along functional lines are already being tried at various schools.
The course in "Practicing Business Law" once offered at New England Law School and taught by several specialists is but one of many

7. Id. at 54.
8. Id. at 83.
9. See, e.g., id. at 82-84.
10. Id. at 58.
11. Id. at 84.
12. Examples of Status-based offenses would be statutory rape, involuntary manslaughter,
felony-murder, drunken driving, and conspiracy; Duty is involved in embezzlement and other
"white-collar" crimes where it is closely connected to Reliance. Reliance is also present in criminal fraud. Bargain has obvious connections to conspiracy, illegal contracts, and anti-trust arrangements. A large number of offenses that are will-based (based on individual intent) like
Bargain, but in the unilateral, rather than bilateral sense, would require a new organizing principle. Examples of such offenses are murder, voluntary manslaughter, larceny, burglary, and assault and battery. Excuse from otherwise criminal conduct is seen in such defenses as insanity,
minority, diminished responsibility, self-defense, ignorance, mistake, and leaving a conspiracy.
See generally Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J. Crm. L. &
CRU]NwOLooy 465 (1991) (analyzing Excuse in criminal law).
As in civil obligation, most criminal obligation is owed to other individuals or entities. The
crucial difference conceptually is in the sanction, not in the breaking of the obligation itself.
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examples. 3 I will allude briefly to such efforts and then focus on the
the entire curriculum at George
track system being used throughout
4
Mason University Law School.'
I believe that such attempts should build upon the first-year conceptual framework I have described. Though the possibilities for upperlevel functional integration are many, they should mimic to the extent
possible the ways in which practicing lawyers confront actual legal
problems. This will generally involve applying legal doctrine from a
number of the traditional fields to a common problem.
The focus of this Article is not, however, to prescribe the exact
shape of such curricula. Rather, it is to convince the reader that such
changes are practical in the modern law school setting. With this in
mind, I devote much of the Article to the implementation of the new
pedagogical jurisprudence: the move from theory to practice.
II.

SCOPE OF

Tins ARTICLE

The first step in my research was to examine what had been written
regarding the making of a paradigm-shift in what is being taught. I
started with Harold Lasswell's and Myres McDougal's prodigious attempt to restructure legal education as policy science during World
War II.11 With this background sketched, I moved rather quickly to

several modern articles reflecting current efforts at making radical
change.' 6 Some of these propose that legal education be made more

13. See, e.g., NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, 1988-89 CATALOGUE 80 (1988). Subtitled The
Saga of Jack Cronin and the Family Business, this course was a "semester-long simulation exercise integrating, inter alia, relevant aspects of partnership, corporations, and family law along
with professional responsibility and lawyering skills." Id.
14. This is most recently described in GEORGE MASON UNraRSIrTY SCHOOL OF LAW, CATALOGUE 1991-92 (1991). See discussion infra at notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
15. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Profes:
sional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943). This effort is more fully de28-38.
scribed infra text accompanying notes
16. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF LEGAL HiERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); Jay M. Feinman, Change in Law Schools, 16
N.M. L. REv. 505 (1986) (discussing a mega-course Professor Feinman taught in "Contorts," a
merger of civil obligation principles shared by Contract and Tort theory); Karl Johnson & Ann
Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons Why We Sing, 16 N.M. L. REV.
433 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, CriticalLegal Studies, and Legal
Education or "The Fem-CritsGo to Law School, " 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988); Symposium,
Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy,Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. LEOAL EDUC. 3 (1988);
John W. Van Doren, PrivateProperty: A Study in Incoherence, 63 U. DET. L. REv. 683, 684-96
(1986) (critiquing traditional property definitions in casebooks and treatises as examples of indeterminacy of property rights in legal system); Cornel West, Brendan Brown Lecture: Reassessing

the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 34 Loy. L. Rav. 265 (1988); K.C. Worden, Overshooting
the Target: A FeministDeconstruction of Legal Education, 34 Am. U. L. Rav. 1141 (1985).
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and several propose that justice be made the organizing

"metaprinciple"

for a restructured legal education.1 8 I think both of

these goals can be achieved through implementation of my proposed
system.

My second step was to examine major reforms in first-year curricula that were tried during the 1980s or that are being implemented
today. I found that while very modest steps had been taken toward

integration at a number of schools such as Miami and Cleveland
State, and to a slightly greater extent at Columbia,' 9 the more farreaching changes tried at Harvard,20 CUNY-Queens,

2t

and just begun

at Georgetown22 were deserving of more thorough analysis. I will discuss in some detail the approaches utilized at these three schools and
suggest the successes and shortcomings of each, while recommending
ways each might utilize the approach I have delineated.
Finally, I felt it necessary to examine how any major curricular
change actually is or can be effected in the law schools. This involved

17. See, e.g., Roger 1. Abrams & Michael R. Masinter, The New Nova Curriculum: Training Lawyers for the Twenty-First Century, 12 NOVA L. REv. 77 (1987) (discussing new program
of workshops in various subjects); Stewart Macauley, "The Reliance Interest" and the World
Outside the Law Schools' Doors, 1991 Wts. L. REv. 247 (1991) (empirical study arguing that
new conceptual favorite-the reliance interest-is little used by judges); Andrew E. Taslitz, Exorcising Langdell's Ghost 43 HASTiNGS L.J. 143 (1991) (analyzing new type of problem-oriented
textbook in Criminal Procedure). See also Kristine Strachan, Rationalizing the Law School Curriculum: Early Notes from a Field Experiment, (unpublished manuscript, University of Utah
Law School) (suggesting "capstone" courses designed to equip graduating students with what
they need to know to begin practicing law). A number of other such articles are listed in note 1
of Strachan's manuscript.
18. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, The Revolution in American Law Schools, 37 CLaV. ST. L.
REv. 227 (1989), discussed infra at note 48 and text accompanying notes 44-57; Anthony D'Amato, Rethinking Legal Education, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1990), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 57-68.
19. See Curtis J. Berger, A Pathway to CurricularReform, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 547 (1989).
More details of the Columbia changes are contained in Draft, Committee on Curricular Reform
Final Report Columbia University Law School (1987) and Revised Draft, The Foundation Curriculum, Columbia University Law School (1988) (on file with author). See also infra text accompanying note 137.
20. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Harvard First-Year Experiment, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 491
(1989). A number of unpublished papers of the faculty concerning this and related Harvard
curricular changes are available to member and fee-paid schools from the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), Washington, D.C. See also infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
21. See Matthew S. Steffey & Paulette Wunsch, A Report on CUNY's Experiment in Humanistic LegalEducation:Adrift Toward Mainstream, 59 UMKC L. Rav. 155 (1991).
22.

See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, REPORT OF THE CoMnMTTEE ON CURRICU-

LUM REFORm (Fall 1990) (on file with author). The new curriculum is detailed in the Georgetown
Law Center's 1990-91 catalogue. See also infra notes 99-125 and accompanying text, which includes an interview by the author with Georgetown Professor Mark Tushnet, a founder of the
program.
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an inquiry into the workings of a law school as an institution and into
how major change can be achieved in such an institution. To do this, I
drew on several articles discussing in general the politics of the curricular reform process. 23 I then looked at how actual reform occurred at
particular law schools.2 This latter information was gleaned through
curriculum committee reports, interviews, and personal experiences.
With this groundwork established, I close by detailing the process necessary to effect the particular reform program I espouse.
III.

SHIFTING THE LEGAL EDUCATION PARADIGM: DEMOCRATIC
VALUES AND JUSTICE

The Langdellian construct 25 was "successful" to a large extent in
divorcing law from justice. Along with its post-World War II reincarnation as "reasoned elaboration, '2 6 it focused on making the process
of rendering decisions fair and logical, rather than on the substance of
the legal outcomes this process produced. One can readily understand
the desire of an established American elite to view law as a product of
science and thus to separate it from conceptions of justice being devel-

23. See, e.g., Neil I. Cohen, The Process of Curricular Reform, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535
(1989); see also Feinman, supra note 16; Eleanor M. Fox, The Good Law School, The Good
Curriculum, and the Mind and the Heart, 39 J.LEGAL EDUC. 473 (1989); Robert Gorman, Introduction to Curriculum Developments: A Symposium, 39 J. LEnAL EDuc. 469 (1989).
24. In addition to reading all the recent relevant curriculum documents collected by the
AALS, see supra note 20, and the articles cited supra notes 19-22 about curricular changes at
particular schools, the author interviewed Professor Anthony Chase at Nova University Law
Center in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; Professor Ken Casebeer of the University of Miami Law
School; and Professor Mark Tushnet at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington,
D.C., about the reforms at their schools.
25. Christopher Columbus Langdell received his LL.B. from Harvard in 1853 and practiced
law in New York City until 1870. From 1870 to 1895, Langdell served as dean of Harvard Law
School. By selecting what he thought were the important reported appellate cases, he deduced
certain abstract formal rules and doctrines which he applied across-the-board to contracts cases
that had formerly been segregated into separate fields. Thus, the same rules would apply to
contracting parties A and B regardless of whether they were similarly situated individuals or, for
example, a large corporation and its lowest-paid worker. This method was then applied by other
scholars to other fields such as torts. Because it divorced law from both the characteristics of the
parties and the situation in which the dispute arose, it reached a logical legal result without
regard to whether-in the broader sense-that decision was just. See Chester & Alumbaugh,
supra note 1,at 26 nn.7-8 (citing GRANT GILMORE, TiE DEATH OF CONTRACT 98 (1974); CIRISTOPHER C. LANODELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii-ix (1871); ROBERT
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL-LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850'S TO THE 1980's 38
(1983)).
See also Anthony Chase, American Legal Education Since 1885: The Case of the Missing
Modern, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 519 (1985), for a comparison of the Langdellian construct with
Legal Realism.
26. The phrase was coined by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKINo AND APPLICATION OF LAW 170 (1988). See G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 144 (1978).
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oped by the multicultural influx that threatened this elite's hegemony.
Thus, whether preservation of the property and prerogatives of the
elite was in any broad sense "just," it was held out to be "scientific"
because it was attained through "objective" law.
World War II, however, posed the question for American legal
scholars of what made our system so different from those of the Axis
powers, and thus so worthy of preservation. Legal Realism had
largely served to shore up Langdellianism by bringing its tenets down
to the realm of practicality. In the process, it substituted a posteriori
for a priorireasoning; it largely described the workings of the existing
27
system without asking what values informed that system.
At the height of the war, Professors Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal at Yale tried to reverse this situation, giving American law
a purpose: that of preserving and promoting democratic values. Their
carefully reasoned attempt to cause American lawyers to think and
talk about law in a different way ultimately had little effect outside of
their own classrooms. 28 However, their effort to construct a new pedagogical jurisprudence and use it in teaching bears significant discussion here.
Lasswell and McDougal wanted to restructure the legal educational
system to emphasize the policy-making aspects of law. They observed
that the existing curriculum was not oriented toward the achievement
of democratic values. 29 In their proposed curriculum, by contrast, democracy-'"the realization of human dignity in a commonwealth of
mutual deference"-was the "cardinal value." 30
"Democracy" to Lasswell and McDougal was defined largely in
terms of "process:" It is difficult to find in their construct a substantive idea of justice. They began by describing three values whose
proper relationship "determines whether we are justified in calling
any group democratic ....
[These values include] power, respect,
3
and knowledge." '
They defined "power" as "the ability to participate in the making
of important decisions." 32 "Respect" was the "absence of interference with individual choice [and] equality of access to opportunity for
maturing latent capacity into socially valued expression. ' 33 "Know-

27. See, e.g.,BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 17 (1984); GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 87 (1977).
28. See generally STEVENS, supra note 25, at 264-70.
29. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 15, at 232.
30. Id. at 217.

31.

Id.

32.
33.

Id. at 219.
Id. at 223.

1993]

FIRST-YEAR LEGAL DOCTRINE

ledge" was the understanding of the potentialities of human beings
for congenial and productive interpersonal relations, which makes it
a4
possible for them to remain loyal to democratic ideals)
Next, Lasswell and McDougal proposed anchoring the curriculum
with six courses that reflected the democratic values and variables they
had identified. These were "Law and Control," "Law and Intelligence," "Law and Distribution," "Law and Production," "Law and
Character," and "Law and Community Development." 35 They also
proposed various upper-level courses, such as "Ideology," "Diplomacy," "Economy," and "Strategy.' '36
Short of attaining such a complete restructuring of the curriculum,
the authors suggested redirection of each course within the standard
course format. Teachers in each course would systematically call students' attention to the concept of law as a reflection of society's response to its values and goals within different contexts. In the process,
they would discredit the notion that the Langdellians' arbitrary categorization of law represented some definitive, all encompassing embodiment of right and wrong. Because the social goals emphasized in
each course would be the same, this limited approach would provide
functional integration of doctrine even where traditional course
37
boundaries remained.
Either complete curriculum redesign of the sort indicated or the limited reform offered as a backup was pretty heady stuff for most lawyers. Although it was healthy for legal educators to conceive of their
students as acting within the confines of the Regulatory State, the
connections between what ordinary lawyers do on a day-to-day basis

34. See id. at 225. Additional variables related to democratic values include "balance,"
"regularity," "realism," "character," "safety," and "health." Id. at 226-32.
35. Id. at 256-62. The following list provides a synopsis of the base courses:
(1) "Law and Control" studies power, how it is distributed and "how legal syntax, procedures, and structures affect, or can be made to affect, this distribution." Id. at 256.
(2) "Law and Intelligence" investigates how "more people can be given access to, and skill
in interpreting, the facts necessary to decisions that will promote democratic values." Id.
at 257.
(3) "Law and Distribution" examines "the effect of legal syntax, procedures, and structures
upon property distribution and .. . their potentialities for the attainment of varying
states of balanced distribution." Id. at 259.
(4) "Law and Production" involves the "role of money in relation to the technical processes
of production." Id. at 260.
(5) "Law and Character" considers "factors affecting the distribution of respect in society."
Id. at 261.
(6) "Law and Community Development" cuts across all major values and variables in considering "the relation of legal syntax, procedures, and structures to the utilization of
resources in communities of varying size." Id.
36. Id. at 275-78.
37. Id. at 248-56.
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and what the authors proposed was too abstract to gather the support
of the bar.38 Furthermore, it required lawyers to learn a language unfamiliar to them, the language of political science. I suspect that to be
accepted, a functional reorganization of doctrine must use concepts
such as Status, Bargain, Reliance, Duty, and Excuse, which are implicit in existing legal discourse. Certainly, these principles developed
out of the American legal system's desire to foster "democratic ideals" or "justice," at least of the procedural, nonjudgmental kind. Focusing on them initially rather than on a metaprinciple like justice
should be much more acceptable to lawyers: It would provide structure, though of a less detailed kind than at present. This would allow
analysis to proceed in ways somewhat akin to existing legal discourse.
Once conclusions were reached as to liability or nonliability in given
situations by means of this discourse, the ties to metaprinciples such
as justice or democratic ideals could be made explicit.
Like the rest of American institutions, American law sought not
utopia, but a "return to normalcy" after the horrors and dislocations
of World War II. Legal educators, in turn, sought relief from the anomic influences of Realism, finding it in the reassuring "objectivism"
of neo-Langdellians such as Henry Hart, Albert Sacks,3 9 and Herbert
Wechsler.4° Under this regime, truth-or at least a truth of sortscould be found in the "reasoned elaboration" of legal argument in
search of "neutral" principles. 41 Further, in a pluralistic society rife
with potential disagreement on the substance of law, emphasis on legal process continued to afford comfort.
Thus, the pedagogical jurisprudence I faced upon entering law
school in 1966 seemed oddly detached from the exciting world of ideas
to which college had introduced me. By the time of my graduation in
1970, however, law school's coldly rational emphasis on rigorous, reductive analysis had been profoundly shaken by events outside the
academy. Thus, it is not accidental that much of the leftist critique of
legal education during the 1970s and 1980s came from my contemporaries, who also experienced these changes. Their attack, which is dis38. See generally Sravaws, supra note 25.
39. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 26. The authors co-taught a course of the same name at
Harvard for many years. Their contributions to American jurisprudence are discussed in WrITE,
supra note 26, at 144-50.
40. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law 71 HAav. L.
REV. 1 (1959); see also WHITE, supra note 26, at 146-48.

41. The basic idea of these scholars was that American jurisprudence should focus on process rather than the substance of law and reach conclusions through careful published analysis of
the reasons for a given result. In this way, the precedent each conclusion represented could be
used as a reliable guide to the solution of future disputes. See generally WrITE, supra note 26, at
144-52.
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cussed and cited in the previous article, was largely critical rather than
reconstructive. 42 By the mid-1980s, however, as this generation
reached middle age and gained prominence on law faculties, the focus
4
began to turn from deconstruction to reconstruction.
IV.

PRESENT SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM:

A Focus

ON JUSTICE?

My contemporary, David Barnhizer, chronicles this shift in The
Revolution in American Law Schools, an article appearing in 1989."
He observes that the withering criticism from the left in the '70s and
'80s both signaled and contributed to the breakdown of the Langdellian/Legal Realist compromise in legal education. 45 Thus there has occurred "a loss of a sense of organic unity in the law schools because a
unified vision has been replaced by a much more fragmented and
complex collage of interests."46 The fact that old methods of discourse
(Langdellianism and Legal Realism) were expanded to their limits and
used up necessitated the development of alternative intellectual paradigms .47

42. The focal concerns of this movement, consisting largely of law professors who went to
law school amidst the sturm und drang of the late 1960s and early 1970s, can be found in DAVID
KARYs, THE POLmICS OF LAWS: A PROostassiE CRmQTE (2d ed. 1990). Some of its major proponents are Gerald Frug, Duncan Kennedy, and Morton Horwitz at Harvard; Claire Dalton at
Northeastern; Mark Tushnet at Georgetown; John Schlegel at SUNY-Buffalo; and Peter Gabel
at New School of Law in San Francisco. See generally A Symposium of Critical Legal Studies,
34 Am. U. L. REV. 926 (1985); John H. Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and
Affectionate History of the Conference on CriticalLegal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REv. 391 (1984);
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
See also Richard L. Abel, A Critiqueof Torts, 37 UCLA L. REv. 785 (1990); Paul Brest, State
Action and Liberal Theory: A Case Note of Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296
(1982); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing RacialDiscrimination Through AntidiscriminationLaw:
A Critical View of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Alan D. Freeman &
Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-PrivateDistinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REv.
237 (1987); Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984);
Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 306-18 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Critical
Labor Law Theory; A Comment, 4 INDUs. REL. L. J. 503 (1981); Van Doren, supra note 16.
43. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies. The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HAxv. L. REv. 985 (1990); Joseph W. Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Ed Sparer, Fundamental Rights, Legal Entitlements and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509 (1984); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (outlining proposal for reconstructive feminist jurisprudence); Patricia J.
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Idealsfrom DeconstructedRights, 22 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
44. Barnhizer, supra note 18.
45. See id. at 227-28.
46. Id. at 233.
47. See id. at 246. But see Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case
Method, 36 VIuL. L. REv. 517, 545-61 (1991) (offering justification for maintaining the case
method).
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Ideally, this change should shift attention away from subdividing
legal scholarship into increasingly smaller doctrinal units toward viewing the legal system as a whole.4 I, like many of my generation of law
teachers, no longer assume the value neutrality of legal rules; 49 thus we
are uncomfortable teaching law as merely a series of rules to be memorized and then applied by our students.5"
Barnhizer believes that the 1990s will witness some sort of consolidation of the diverse thinking that has evolved regarding alteration of
the legal educational paradigm. 5' Although most of his article is descriptive rather than prescriptive, he does indicate that the focus of
this consolidation will be on justice, the driving "metaprinciple" behind the legal educational paradigm.12 If Barnhizer is right, one can
only conclude that such a consolidation will be healthy. One view of
how that consolidation could occur is outlined in the previous article;
it involves de-mystification and reorganization of existing doctrine in
ways that would ultimately facilitate discussions of justice or fairness.53 To reiterate, I do not believe it realistic to skip doctrinal analysis altogether in making this shift.
As Barnhizer correctly points out, there are a number of new paradigms now being tried out. Many are frankly less structuralist than my
own approach, emphasizing diversity and pluralism. It is difficult to
see how the views of Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Studies,
Feminism,5 4 Post-Feminism, 5 and Legal Semeiotics,56 just to name a
few, can be consolidated into a new paradigm unless that paradigm,
like my own, serves as a facilitator rather than as a dictator of how
such views should be expressed.

48.

Cf. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 256. Barnhizer argues that despite "striking examples"

to the contrary, the majority of American legal scholars have not expanded the scope of their
inquiry beyond doctrinal analysis. Id.
49. But see id. at 255. Barnhizer does, however, admit that some movement away from
"neutral principles" has occurred "quite recently." Id.
50. See id. at 230.
51. See id. at 263.
52. Id.
53. Chester & Alumbaugh, supra note 1.

54.
55.

See id. at 43-45.
See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Example of Lesbians: A Posthumous Reply to Professor

Mary Joe Frug, 105 HAxv. L. REV. 1084 (1992); Mary Joe Frug, A Post Modern Feminist Legal

Manifesto, 105 HAuv. L. REV. 1045 (1992); Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A
Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1992); Barbara Johnson, The Postmodern in Feminism, 105 HARv. L. RV. 1076 (1992); Martha Minow, Incomplete
Correspondence: An Unsent Letter to Mary Joe Frug, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1096 (1992); Frances
Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1989); Frances Olsen, In Memoriam: Mary Joe Frug, 14 HARv. WoMaN's L.J. i (1991).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70. See also Duncan Kennedy, A Semeiotics of
LegalArgument, 75 SYRAcusE L. REv. 75 (1991).

19931

FIRST-YEAR LEGAL DOCTRINE

A recent article by Anthony D'Amato elaborates Barnhizer's notion
that discussions of justice can provide the new focal point for legal
education. 7 Like Barnhizer, however, D'Amato seems content to analyze a metaprinciple like justice without first reorganizing existing
doctrine.
D'Amato suggests that rather than teaching students to manipulate
"law-words" in formulating legal arguments, professors in existing
courses should "teach ways of reinterpreting those rules in light of an
assumed legislative purpose to be just.""5 This shift, he claims, would
not necessitate a total realignment of the courses or casebooks. For
example, he suggests teaching justice through the case-law method,
but changing the focus in courses from discovering the rule of law
that the case announces to analyzing whether justice was done to the
parties1 9
D'Amato advocates teaching law through a series of "justice-dialogues. ' " 6 Under this technique, students would be presented with a
decision as to who actually won in a given case. From there, the discussion would focus upon whether justice was done in that situation.
For example, the instructor might inquire whether certain facts were
left out that might have been relevant to a just decision. Finally, the
instructor might ask, "Did the court actually reach a just result?" 6'
The focus would be "justice questions" -questions that are factually-based rather than law-based.62 "Excessive preoccupation with the
tools (the law-words) . . . elevates tools over goals, form over sub6'3
stance, manipulations over justice.
Ultimately, D'Amato recommends the revision of casebooks to include much fuller versions of the cases than those which casebook editors presently select from the reporters. He wants them to read
transcripts of trials and to present excerpts of evidence presented at
trial, even contacting the lawyers involved for additional information. 64 Finally, the editors should discover and include information re63
garding the post-litigation status of the parties.
It is apparent that D'Amato's new approach centers much more on
increased factual analysis than on doctrinal revision. While I do not

57. See D'Amato, supra note 18, at 1.
58. Id. at 38.
59. Id. at 47-48.
60. Id. at 53-54.
61. See id. at 51-52.
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. at 55.
64. Id. at 53-54.
65. Id. at 54. D'Amato practices what he preaches. See generally ANTHoNY D'AMATo &
ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, JUSTiCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1992) (his recent "coursebook").
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disagree with the need for more factual analysis, I think this can best
be accomplished within the kind of loose, yet helpful, doctrinal
framework I have proposed. I also believe that the production of sets
of "business school"-type problems, whether or not constructed from
reported cases, would be a more efficient way of teaching doctrine
than D'Amato's approach of more exhaustively investigating appellate decisions already rendered.
The need for organizing principles less general than "justice" (such
as those proposed in the previous article) to help develop the type of
case analysis D'Amato proposes is highlighted by his own difficulty in
defining that concept:
[I] believe that justice does not have a "content" that can ever be
expressed in words. My conclusion is not a negative one, but is,
perhaps surprisingly, optimistic. For if anyone could state the
content of justice in a Text, then the Text itself would be subject to
interpretation, misinterpretation, application, and misapplication.
The Justice Text would become just one more set of words. Suppose
that a nation simply enacts the Justice Text as its basic law. Would
law and justice then be fused? Clearly not; the Justice Text would be
nothing more nor less than law-words, and thus it would be subject
to our interpretation or misinterpretation in the light of our sense of
justice! (There is also a second reason: general statements about
justice can never solve specific cases.) My conclusion is simply that
justice cannot, by its nature, ever be reduced to words. 66
I agree with D'Amato's further point that students come to law
school with a collective sense of "justice," formed from common experiences, and that it is this ideal which should form the foundation
or backdrop for legal education. 67 However, I do not believe that useful classroom discussion can be had of "justice issues," with only
D'Amato's vague definition of justice as a guide. As my research assistant commented after carefully considering D'Amato's proposals:
I do not think that the study of actual legal doctrine should be
deemphasized to the point that [it] appears inapposite. Theoretically,
at least [doctrine] is formulated on the basis of judicial decisions
which embody society's vision of what is or is not just. It also forms
the backdrop for judicial decisions. To eliminate this emphasis to
any great extent could serve to eliminate the foundation for a critical
study of justice versus injustice ....
I think more structure is

66.
67.

D'Amato, supra note 18, at 39 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 42.
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required when attempting to facilitate participation in large group
discussions ....
This student is not alone in her search for "structure." Whatever its
faults, Formalist discourse, though modified by Legal Realist and Legal Process theorists, provides such a structure. The emerging field of
legal semeiotics helps explain why we need it.
First of all, we all participate in language games to get about in the
world. As Professor Jack Balkin sees it:
We not only play these games-we live them. The discourses that we
use constitute who we are. These discourses speak us as much as we
speak them. They are the "grooves" in which our thought travels
when it grapples with legal, moral, and political problems. Because
these grooves in a sense constitute us, they have a certain power over
us.... But this power is not external to us. It is already within us. 69
Because existing legal discourse has such power over us, a convincing new language is necessary for us to make the effort required to
break out of the old "grooves" of discourse. 0 This "convincing new
language" is precisely what I propose. I doubt that talk about justice
without new structure is sufficient to convince lawyers to make this
difficult paradigm shift.
V.

CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO RESTRUCTURE FIRST-YEAR EDUCATION

A.

Harvard

Beginning in the fall of 1983, Harvard Law School began experimental sections in its first-year classes. The fundamental premise of
these sections was that the traditional case-law method was outmoded
and should make way, at least in part, for consideration of the modern Regulatory State. 7' This in turn made necessary the integration of
doctrine in new ways.
Scholars in the Administrative Law area had been struggling with
such changes before Harvard began its experiment. Still caught in old

68. Memorandum from Rhonda Wagner, Research Assistant, to the author (Nov. 1991) (on
file with author).
69. J.M. Balkin, Remarks at the Association of American Law Schools 1992 Annual Meeting, Mini-Workshop on Jurisprudence, San Antonio, Tex. (Jan. 4, 1992). See also J.M. Balkin,
Postmodern Jurisprudence: An Introduction, in Association of American Law Schools, Program for 1992 Annual Meeting 16 (1991) (on file with author).
70. Balkin, Remarks, supranote 69.
71. Rakoff, supra note 20, at 492-93.
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ways of analysis, however, they "quickly retreated to assessing the judiciary's response to the policy-making functions of the Regulatory
State; they had no conceptual framework for a legal analysis of statutes, regulations, [and] administrative enforcement strategies . . . ,,2
Thus, the struggle in Administrative Law has been to construct new
forms of discourse in the public law arena. "While it draws on law
and economics, critical legal studies, and other current intellectual
trends, [current Public Law] represents a new approach, deriving its
methodology from a wide range of academic disciplines, and its ideology from the norms that animate the modern [Regulatory State] itself." ' 73 It is noteworthy that this same pluralistic approach was
applied in the Harvard experiment as it attempted to analyze the connections between regulation and the common law.
Quite properly, the experimental Harvard curriculum was set up to
"teach across the boundaries of traditionally separate courses." ' 74 One
way to achieve this synthesis was to have the first-year teachers coordinate their lesson plans. They worked together "so that certain connected or coinciding issues or principles were taught
contemporaneously in different courses." "
Secondly, in an effort to "drop the boundaries altogether," the students participated in three "bridge periods" in each semester. During
these periods, all of the professors in an experimental section used a
cooperative format to teach an intensive week integrating their courses
by means of a cross-cutting perspective: e.g., Law and Economics,
Law and Justice, or the Significance of Legal Realism. These bridge
periods utilized new materials developed by the professors that sought
to illuminate common law and regulatory problems already touched
on in the standard courses.76
A primary virtue of the Harvard experiment, as seen by the students, was that they no longer had to search for "some primary, immutable category" into which to fit a legal problem; rather, they
77
viewed "the problem in relation to the legal system as a whole."1
According to Professor Todd Rakoff, a participant in the program,
the experimental curriculum better prepared students for upper-level

72.

Association of American Law Schools, Program for 1992 Annual meeting, Section on

Administrative Law, The New Public Law (Jan. 6, 1992).
73. Id.
74. Rakoff, supra note 20, at 493.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 497.
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courses, and seeing the professors working together during bridge periods "liberated the students' minds." 78 Presumably he meant by this
that their minds were freed from the Langdellian/Legal Realist construct by exposure to alternative paradigms presented by institutionally-legitimized sources.
Professor Rakoff mentions two difficult and related practical problems with the Harvard program: (1) the tremendous amount of time
and effort devoted to the program by professors; and (2) the need for
79
long-term institutional assistance to sustain it.
These problems became acute with the appointment in 1989 of politically conservative
professor Robert Clark as dean. Since that time, institutional support
(in terms of money, course loading and "credit" for the new teaching
rather than research) has dwindled. Finally, in the fall of 1991, no
experimental section at all was offered to incoming Harvard law students .0
The apparent death of the Harvard experiment raises several areas
of concern for potential reformers. It also has something to say about
the politics of curricular reform, a topic I will examine in detail at the
end of this Article. At this juncture, however, I would like to focus on
the structure of the Harvard program.
Although it does not really solve the doctrinal redundancy problem
described in the first article, the coordination of lesson coverage by
the Harvard instructors seems like a good, if ad hoc, step toward
breaking down. traditional legal categorization. My understanding,
however, is that this aspect of the program gradually fell into disuse,
placing greater and greater responsibility on the bridge periods to provide integration., Undoubtedly the lack of a set of common organizing principles to guide this integration would have made the
coordination of lesson plans onerous, time-consuming, and, ultimately, piecemeal. What about the bridge periods themselves?
The Harvard bridge periods represent a typical response of "liberal
education" to an outdated thought-paradigm: present students with a
variety of readings suggesting alternative ways of viewing the issues.
Certainly, a Harvard student who had experienced the experimental
curriculum would gain a more complete notion of how first-year doctrine might fit into the overall legal system than would his or her more
traditionally-educated counterparts. The problem is, however, that

78.
79.
80.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 498-99.
Conversations with several Harvard Law professors confirmed this dwindling of sup-

port. For the 1991-92 first-year curriculum, see HAtvARD LAW SCHOOL, BuLLETrN (1991-92).

81. Telephone interviews with several participating Harvard law professors (Fall 1991)
[hereinafter Telephone interviews].
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while a variety of integrating strategies might be helpful for the experienced scholar, for the first-year student, even at Harvard, it might
finally produce more intellectual chaos than coherence.
The chief difficulty, then, of the Harvard experiment's structure
would appear to be its teaching of doctrine under traditional course
headings, in more or less traditional form, coupled with periodic attempts during bridge periods to suggest, from different perspectives,
ways of integrating that doctrine. I would submit that some consensus-even at relatively broad levels-on how that doctrine can be re82
shaped for students should have been reached first.
In the prior article, Alumbaugh and I recommended that the integration of doctrine should proceed along functional lines.8 3 Within
this revised structure (new paradigm), it would then seem feasible to
suggest, for instance, Law and Economics or Legal Realism as different ways to illuminate functional relationships in the doctrine itself.
While I understand that Harvard's laissez-faire approach to structural
change was probably considered necessary for political purposes, the
varied, often contradictory insights this necessitated may have contained the seeds of the experiment's ultimate demise. Certainly it contributed to the experiment's failure to broaden its political appeal
both within and without the institution.
B.

CUNY-Queens: CurricularReform in a New Law School

Curricular reform at an established institution like Harvard may
present somewhat greater difficulties than does "starting from
scratch" in a new school.8" Still, such difficulties are far from absent
in a new school, as can be seen from the experience at CUNY-Queens.
The Queens Law School of the City University of New York originated in the early 1980s with a self-consciously different focus than
most law schools: public service. The most distinctive features of its
curriculum were its emphasis on humanistic teaching and its focus on
"experiential learning. '86 Among other things, courses in the new cur82. The degree of integration with other courses in the section was, of course, at the ultimate discretion of the teacher of each course, further confusing students. For a student's somewhat dim view of the experiment, see generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A
MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1992).

83. See Chester & Alumbaugh, supra note 1, at 27.
84. Thus, I am suggesting that revised legal doctrine, at least at these relatively general
levels, be the initial focus of attempts to analyze law from different theoretical perspectives. I
realize that this is structuralist to a degree and cuts somewhat against recent trends toward diversity and pluralism in legal scholarship. See, e.g., articles collected supra note 16. See also Chester
& Alumbaugh, supranote 1, at 44-55 nn.78-82, and accompanying text. The ultimate purpose of
these analyses would, however, be to focus on justice and fairness as the ends of law.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 127-28.
86. Steffey & Wunsch, supra note 21, at 159-60.
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riculum were designed to break down "three unnecessary divisions
CUNY [saw] in the usual courses: between different private law doctrines; between private 7and public law; and between the study of law
and other disciplines."

The 1991-93 CUNY-Queens catalogue lists such required first- and
second-year courses as "Liberty, Equality and Due Process in Historical and Philosophical Context"; "Law and a Market Economy";
"The Work of a Lawyer"; "Responsibility for Injurious Conduct";
"Civil and Criminal Procedure"; "Public Institutions and Law"; and
"Constitutional Structures and the Law." 8 It can immediately be seen
from this menu that functional integration of the basic subjects has
been attempted along with a strong emphasis on law in the Regulatory
State.
A recent article by Matthew Steffey and Paulette Wunsch"9 describes in detail the progress of the CUNY curriculum since its inception. The gist of the article is that the program, which originally
represented a radical departure from the norm in legal education, has
undergone major modifications largely because of the low bar pass
rate of its students.
First, as a result of bar exam pressure, the law school has expanded
its coverage of black letter law, which, in turn, has lessened the
amount of time devoted to experiential learning simulations. Whereas
the original curriculum did not emphasize test-taking, the new emphasis on learning rules is currently supplemented by a series of exams
designed to measure students' mastery of them2.
In addition, institutional pressures have forced the founders of the
program to abandon the group decision-making process, which is one
of the main tenets of humanistic teaching, in favor of traditional hierarchical policy-making. The university itself has also been putting
pressure on Queens law professors to publish at a rate equivalent to
professors at established schools. This takes away from the time the
teachers were devoting to the new curriculum.9 1 Thus, Steffey and
Wunsch conclude, pressure both from outside and inside the univer87. Id. at 163. Functionalization and integration of doctrine is rampant in these courses.
For example, "Responsibility for Injurious Conduct" combines tort and criminal law; "Civil
and Criminal Procedure" is a unitary course; and "Law and a Market Economy" stresses law's
relationship to individual economic associations like corporations, and finally covers administrative law and labor. This last course also seeks to demonstrate the interdependence of public and
private law. See id.
88. Cniv UuvRasrTY oF NEw YORK SCHOOL OF LAw AT QUEENS COLLEOE, 1991-1993 CATALooruE 9-13 (1991).
89. Steffey & Wunsch, supra note 21.
90. Id. at 169, 177.
91. Id. at 172.
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sity is stifling the program before it can be completely developed,
leaving the school "adrift toward mainstream." 92
That bar exam pressures and the "publish or perish" mentality
have combined to retard the Queens experiment should surprise no
one. In an ideal world, we might expect the bar exam to change to
accommodate realistic innovations such as those at Queens. The California bar exam, for example, now contains a day of "performance"
testing that puts the applicant into a situation testing his or her lawyering skills. 93 In such situations, the applicant is given the raw material (from statutes, regulations, and a "file") that a new lawyer might
process, and asked to deal with a "real life situation" involving not so
much application of memorized doctrine, but integration of the presented material within the broad legal understanding needed to provide solutions. Certainly, this tests conceptual integration of doctrine
as well as pragmatic skills; it thus might fit rather well with a progressive curriculum such as that at Queens.
Even in California, however, bar applicants are required to take a
day of traditional essay type questions and one day of the multiplechoice Multistate exam. Each of these components assumes that traditional doctrine, once memorized, is certain enough to provide more or
less "correct" answers to legal problems. This type of testing constitutes the entire bar exam in most states. 94 Not only does such an approach disregard the scholarly work of the '70s and '80s regarding the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine, 95 but there are so many hypothetical
problems presented in these tests that the emphasis is largely on issuespotting at the expense of analysis. In general, then, the typical modern bar exam can be viewed as a dysfunctional and retrograde "rite of
passage," presenting a severe roadblock to those who would reform
legal education.
The problems inherent in changing the bar exams are complex and
difficult. If enough schools in a particular jurisdiction-as well as the
"national" schools-were to make major innovations in curriculum,
this would eventually force bar exam change. In the meantime, however, students in progressive schools would be faced with the necessity
of learning how to be lawyers in law school and studying separately
for the bar exam. Students such as those admitted to Columbia and
Harvard, because of their success at traditional exams, can be ex-

92.
93.

Id. at 177.
See, e.g., State of California, Committee of Bar Examiners, PERoRMtANcE TEST AND

SELECTED ANSWERS, CALIFORNIA BAR EXAMINATION (July 1991).

94.
95.

See BAR/BRI Digest, 1992 Edition, at 4-8, for a state-by-state analysis.
See, e.g., articles cited supra note 42.
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pected to be better at this balancing act than students admitted under
96
the "diversity" admissions policy of a school like Queens.
Of course, law professors already face the difficulty of trying to
prepare their students to be lawyers when these students feel the need
to be taught "rules" in order to pass the bar exam. Thus, at Queens,
a progressive curriculum exacerbates an existing problem in legal education and, at least in the case of the relatively weak test-takers that
constitute its student body, dooms many of them to fail the bar exam
unless they receive additional instruction. What is needed, then, is reform directed at the bar itself. At first blush, this would seem an almost impossible political task for those already struggling to change
curricula within the law schools themselves. However, were these reformers to promote the idea among leaders of the bar that a performance-based exam would allow law schools to train students more
effectively for practice, the bar itself might carry out this needed
change.
An alternative might be to eliminate the bar exam entirely. Wisconsin allows students graduating from its two law schools to become
members of the bar without taking the exam. Could this "diploma
privilege" be followed in other states? The perceived problem in doing
this is "quality control," although the bar exams are largely ineffective in providing it. The United States already has too many law
schools graduating too many lawyers. For various political and economic reasons, many schools take substandard students, and once
they do, do little to assure that only those who would make competent
lawyers graduate. Thus the bar itself understandably feels some pressure to assure the citizenry that it will not be admitting unqualified
people. Ultimately, however, the bar too succumbs to political pressure by providing those who fail several or even unlimited chances to
retake the exam. Thus, whether or not these graduates have become
competent to practice law, most are admitted on their second or sub9
sequent attempts .
In sum, the outdated "rite of passage" which is the bar exam puts
takers through pointless aggravation so that the legal profession may
pretend it is keeping out unqualified people. If this felt need persists,
the examiners at least might attempt to make the exam relevant to the
practice of law. However, the examiners are not for the most part
professional educators and have generally taken the path of least resistance, molding their tests after those they took in law school. As a
96.

See Steffey & Wunsch, supra note 21, at 168.

97. See generally Stephen P. Klein, Bar Examination: Ignoring the Thermometer Does Not
Change the Temperature, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1989, at 30 ("On a licensing test, such as the

bar exam, an applicant can eventually pass by retaking the test one or more times.") (emphasis
in original).
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first step to reforming the bar exam, then, established schools such as
Harvard and Georgetown, with their influence on the bar, rather than
schools like Queens, must take the lead. Such a step has already been
undertaken at Georgetown, where an attempt has been made to include members of the bar as advisors in reform of the first-year curriculum. 98
In contrast to the bar exam barrier, the "publish-or-perish" problem is relatively easy to address. Politically, law schools feel a need to
require, or (after tenure) to encourage, publication, to justify the low
teaching loads and high salaries of their professoriates to legislatures,
universities, and boards of trustees. While not without its own difficulties, the giving of credit, money, and release time for work on innovative curricula equal to or greater than that provided for
traditional scholarship is largely a matter of institutional will, coupled
with successful institutional politics. In fact, it may be easier to convince the world outside the law school that demonstrable additional
work focused on teaching is worthier adjunct to a five- or six-credit
teaching load than is yet another law review article.
C.

Georgetown: Pathway to the Future?

1. In General
The most recent and far-reaching experimental first-year curriculum
at an established school was begun in the fall of 1991 at Georgetown.
The Curricular Reform Committee report announcing the experiment
addresses at least to some degree the concerns raised by the Harvard
and Queens experiences. 9
The Georgetown reform has traceable roots in the Harvard experiment. Abram Chayes, a senior Harvard law professor, spent two
years at Georgetown in the late 1980s sharing his experiences in the
Harvard program. His insights, coupled with the energy and innovation of a group of six younger Georgetown faculty members, produced a program designed to overcome previous problems. 100 While
the Harvard program had been perceived internally as the child of the
"left" in that faculty's bitter internal debates and had little support
98. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 22, at 3. In an interview with Professor Mark Tushnet,
Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Tushnet
Interview] and a participant in the experimental program, the author learned that bar involvement has not so far been substantial. Perhaps what contact there has been was sought more as
political "base-touching" than for substantive advice. Id.
99. See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, supra note 22, at 1-12 (describing the political and educational care with which the experimental section was put into action).
100. Tushnet Interview, supra note 98.
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among alumni and bar outside the institution,o Georgetown's pro-

gram took pains to nurture more widespread acceptance even before
its inception. 10
First, the school applied for and received a substantial grant from
the U.S. Department of Education to fund the experimental first-year
section. Next, careful internal politicking was carried out with the
support of the Dean, which resulted in the fall of 1989 in "overwhelming approval" by the faculty of an "experimental first-year curriculum in principle," subject to final faculty approval, which was to
be required before the actual curriculum was implemented. 03 Then,
"the Dean appointed a committee of distinguished practitioners to
serve as advisors to the [Curricular Reform] Committee, and this
group was regularly consulted and provided much useful advise as the
courses developed." 104 In the fall of 1990, "the Committee hosted an
open house for students at which the proposed curriculum was discussed."' 15 Finally, "throughout the fall, each member of the committee .

.

. presented his or her course to the faculty and gathered

suggestions for improvements.""10 6
Besides touching all the necessary political bases, this process included elements which specifically addressed the Harvard/Queens
problems. First, the Department of Education grant, besides establishing legitimacy, "provided release time for committee members and
will provide additional money for release time and evaluative efforts
during the first two years of the experiment."'a This relieved financial
pressure on the institution to place the committee members in additional courses, while making committee members' efforts important
enough to allay fears about reduced scholarly production.
By including leaders of the bar to help guide the program, Georgetown not only provided further external legitimacy for its efforts, but
probably gained insights about how far its reforms practically could
go. 108 Thus, the Curricular Reform Committee's report specifically addresses the following practical questions: "Will the students learn all
they need to know to be successful lawyers? To understand their upper class courses? To pass the bar exam?"' 1 9
101.
102.
103.
104.

Telephone interviews, supra note 81.
Tushnet Interview, supra note 98.
See GEORGETOWN UNIVERsrrY LAW CENTER, supra note 22, at 2.
Id.at3.

105.
106.

Id.
Id.

107.

Id. at 2.

108. But see Tushnet Interview, supra note 98 (questioning how important such efforts actually were).
109. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSIrY LAW CaNTER, supranote 22, at 11.
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The Committee answers: "The whole point of the experiment is to
revise the curriculum in such a way as to better prepare our students."1 0
Although not all subjects covered in all current first-year courses will
be covered in the same depth (or even at all) in the experiment, much
of the experiment consists of repackaging existing material into new
course units. We have made a conscientious effort not to eliminate
anything crucial to the career of our students. Toward this end, each
member of the committee has prepared a "crosswalk" that gives a
rough guide to what is and is not covered from the standard
curriculum.... The Committee is persuaded that students in the
experiment will not suffer any significant disadvantage and, indeed,
will be better prepared, because of their participation.",

This, of course, is a crucial section of the report and seems to raise
significant problems of its own. It contains no criticism of current bar
exams; thus, it is critical to "repackage" existing material. Unfortunately, the means of this repackaging are left entirely to the discretion
of each participating faculty member, without the guide of any approved organizing principles such as those proposed in the first article. As will become apparent when I analyze some of the course
descriptions, this omission leaves each faculty member somewhat "at
sea" as to how to "pitch his or her repackaging."
Major differences in outlook appear in descriptions of the courses,
which range from entirely new configurations like "Democracy and
Coercion," to a course called "Property in Time," which the instructor rather ruefully admits is basically the traditional property course
with a greater emphasis on historical development." 2 Additionally, as
of the date of the report, the makeup of each student's small section
"Integration" course had not been developed.' Apparently inspired
by the "successful bridge program" at Harvard,"14 these sections are
designed to integrate the other courses through discussions of topics
such as "the nature and history of legal education, the nature of legal
practice and the legal profession, a comparative perspective on a number of legal issues, and the jurisprudential movement from formalism

110.
11.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
See id. at Abstract for the course "Property in Time."
Id. at 12.
Seeid. at5.
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to realism."" ' 5 Again, I would venture that this laissez-faire approach
may confuse students rather than provide the coherence that functional integration would allow.
2.

Evaluation

With any major curricular change, it would seem a good idea to
identify specific goals before undertaking it, and then to design evaluative techniques that could measure the achievement of these goals.
This in fact was recommended by the Law School Data Assembly
Service at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools." 6 If the goals of such reforms were easily quantifiable,
such as increased bar exam passage or increased access to "big-name"
law firms, this would not be too difficult to do. However, what I am
after and what it seems the Georgetown program wants, is a good deal
more complex than that and involves significant subjective elements.
Thus while Georgetown's evaluative techniques might be criticized as
not sufficiently rigorous or scientific, they may be more useful than
such "objective" methods in measuring "success."
First, individuals in the program will be given detailed questionnaires at various points during and after their law school careers.
Their grades will be tracked throughout law school and compared to
those of students in other sections." 7 Finally, at the conclusion of
each school year, participating faculty will conduct a symposium on
the experiment at which faculty members from Georgetown and other
institutions will be asked to evaluate the experiment's success and to
suggest revisions. Nonparticipating students and faculty will be included to determine effects on the institution as a whole."'
3.

The Courses Themselves

The basic courses in Georgetown's experimental section are entitled
"Bargain, Liability, and Exchange," "Democracy and Coercion,"
"Government Processes," "Legal Justice," "Process," and "Property in Time."" 9 In reading through the course synopses provided in
the appendix to the Committee's Report, 20 one thing at least is clear:
the first-year Georgetown student who is exposed to this curriculum
will likely be educated more broadly and deeply about law and the
legal system than any other first-year student has ever been. The mate-

115. Id. at 12.
116. See generally Association of American Law Schools, Program for 1991 Annual Meeting, Section on Teaching Methods (Jan. 1991).
117. See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, supra note 22, at 10-11.
118. Id. at 8.
119. GEORGETOWN UNrvERsITY LAW CENTER, 1991-92 BULLETIN 55-56 (1991).
120. GEORGETOWN UNmwrRsITy LAW CENTER, supra note 22, app.
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rials are rich, complex, and thought-provoking. Although a laissezfaire approach to course design is again evident, there is a certain
thread of functionalism throughout: The arrangement of doctrine is,
on the whole, accomplished by emphasizing the function rules perform, rather than their traditional common-law categorization. This is
greatly facilitated, of course, by the use of courses which, for the
most part, eschew traditional common law labels.
Noteworthy for our purposes is Professor Gary Peller's course entitled "Bargain, Liability and Exchange."''
According to the course
abstract, "this course is conceived as an introduction to what we conventionally think of as the 'private law' courses of the first-year curriculum. Its main overlap with the traditional first-year curriculum is
with the contracts and torts courses, and to a lesser extent with property."' Interestingly enough, however, Peller states that "the 'theory
part' of this course proceeds from the bottom up-that is, from an
initial consideration of the technical, doctrinal issues of private law
and an exploration of how those traditional doctrinal questions raise
the theoretical problems that the course focuses on."'' 3 To do this,
Peller focuses on the structure of legal argument, drawing on Hohfeldian analysis:'24
.. that legal relations should be understood in terms of a small set
of jural opposites and correlatives that are "zero sum" in the sense
that the expansion of one side of Hohfeld's jural relations necessarily
entails a contraction of the other side. Accordingly, the same set of
arguments will always be available ... to argue for or against a
particular doctrinal outcome. 2
Work along these lines has most recently been published by Duncan
Kennedy: its inevitable conclusion is the indeterminacy of legal argu26
ment. 1

121. Id. at Abstract for the course "Bargain, Liability and Exchange."
122. Id. at 1. After reading the entire course abstract, I believe Peller's minimalization of the
property overlap results from the fact that he gives less emphasis to "new property" concepts
(such as rights to government "largesse") than Alumbaugh and I gave them in the previous
article.
123. Id.
124. See Wesley H. Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley H. Hiohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as
Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
125.

GEORGETOWN UNrVERSITY LAW CENTER, supra note 22, app. 1-2.

126. Thus, though there are patterns in the thrust and counter-thrust of legal argument, legal
argument ultimately reaches no predictable results. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); see also Kennedy, supra
note 56.
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While I have no particular quarrel with including. Hohfeldian analysis, I think this should be done within a framework such as that outlined in the first article. First, the traditional doctrine should be
analyzed not in the old ways, but within the set of functional organizing principles such as those I have propounded. These are, it seems to
me, loosely enough constructed to allow students to manipulate legal
argument while at the same time providing some degree of structure to
this manipulation-a structure that is at once more realistic than, and
avoids much of the redundancy of, the old. Thus, my hope is that
such a course would not proceed as if the study of law were totally
inductive; it should recognize the interplay of inductive and deductive
reasoning even in learning's initial stages.
VI.

POLITICS OF CURRICULAR CHANGE

A.

In General

I think we have seen in the case of the Georgetown experiment very
careful attention to the politics of making what is, at least on the surface, a sweeping change in first-year legal education. While the result
of all this "base-touching" may be less than theoretically "pure," the
program is under way, appears to have adequate support and funding,
and exhibits capacity for growth and change. Could any more realistically be done?
The long life of Langdell's construct seems to be a function of its
coherent (if ultimately unrealistic) structure. As I have argued, lawyers will ultimately demand some degree of structure in what replaces
Langdellianism. While the Georgetown experiment offers some hope
that such a construct will emerge, I will now examine whether, given
the political problems to which I have already alluded, a more structured reform of first-year education is presently possible.
B.

Difficulties at Existing Institutions

Most reform attempts will necessarily take place at existing institutions in which "constraints on curriculum design are even greater"
than at new schools like Queens. 127 As Professor Robert G. Gorman
sees it:
IFlaculty members are accustomed to teaching in a certain style,
using certain materials, and in a time frame that will accommodate
their commitment to scholarship; the student population [already has
127.

Gorman, supra note 23, at 469.
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a tradition of preoccupation] with the imperatives of job placement,
and thus by the assumed predilictions of bar examiners and law
firms; and alumni [exist, a group identifying] their priorities in a
manner quite inconsistent with those of a law school ....121
At any institution, however, designing a progressive curriculum will
involve, at the outset, "tradeoffs between faculty [desires] and curriculum."'' 29 Likewise, it will involve tradeoffs between curriculum and
administrative convenience, student demands, and those of the bar. 30
Despite these constraints, it should still be possible to "[bJuild bridges
and foster interrelationships among the traditional first-year
courses .

'...
'131

The process of curriculum reform in this direction involves at least
the following five steps: (1) selection of the curriculum committee; (2)
generation of a proposal; (3) consideration by the committee; (4) approval by the law faculty; and (5) implementation by the faculty and
administration. 3 2 In his careful analysis of these steps, Professor Neil
Cohen of the University of Tennessee stresses that the key to success1 3
ful approval and implementation is the building of "consensus."' 1
Using as a base his experience at Tennessee, Professor Cohen recommends the following steps to achieve such consensus:
(1) Careful selection of the curriculum committee and its chair,
which includes selecting representatives of various factions
who are willing to compromise and of a chair who is a respected as a "doer," and is widely perceived to be "fair";
(2) Education of the faculty about what faculty members at other
law schools are proposing and implementing;
(3) Solicitation of input from the faculty as a whole and the making of tradeoffs, where reasonable, between differing points of
view. This requires knowledge of the various "players" on the
faculty-who will be affected by various changes and who are
likely to support or oppose them;
(4) Recognition and alleviation of real concerns of the faculty by,
e.g., seeking internal or external funding to support faculty development of new materials or to reduce teaching loads of participants; and

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 469-70.
Id.
Fox, supra note 23, at 483.
Id. at 484.
Cohen, supra note 23, at535-36.
Id. at536.
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(5) Acceptance of incremental, as opposed to systemic change., 1 4
One must assume that the dean is behind such reforms and is willing to implement the consensus-building strategies mentioned above.
Even so, Cohen's strategy seems unlikely to achieve truly meaningful
change. One important reason for this is the lack of any coherent theoretical base for the changes proposed. Langdell had one, and it has
lasted, despite a considerable degree of unhappiness among Harvard
students and faculty when Langdell implemented it."' This is why I
propose a broad conceptual apparatus such as the functional approach as an underpinning. While building consensus is important,
the dean must be willing to take the lead and not allow reform to
wander outside a conceptual framework developed by the faculty
members, or little will be really accomplished. Indeed, Harvard's
1980s experiment was criticized as mere "tinkering" even by those on
36
its faculty most committed to change. 1
Curtis Berger takes a cautious approach like Cohen's in describing
the lessons of Columbia's own attempt to reform first-year legal education:
The overarching lesson of curricular reform is to be aware that the
best is often the enemy of the better. To seek "perfection" is to
guarantee failure; one must design a process through which a
strong-if not ideal-set of reforms can gain approval. Success
requires, as a minimum, the selection of a truly broad-based and
representative committee that includes the dean; an unhurried period
of fact finding and committee discussion; informal and relaxed
interchange with the faculty; and above all, the resolution of all
internal differences so as to enable the committee to present a united
front when it seeks formal faculty approval. This process worked at
Columbia, and I am confident that it can be happily emulated

elsewhere. 137
While there is much to be said for such pragmatism, what it tends
to produce is merely the addition of cross-cutting perspective-type
courses to the already existing curriculum. Such courses tend to be
marginalized by the students themselves, who still feel Contracts,

134. See id. at 536-43.
135. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 25, at 56, 66 n. 15 (citing, e.g., GunwoRE, supra note 27,
4148).
136. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Dissent from the Report of the Committee on Educational
Planning and Development to the Harvard Law School Faculty (Apr. 5, 1982); see also Separate
Statement of Student Member of the Committee Molly Burke '82, to the Harvard Law School
Faculty (Oct. 14, 1982) (on file with author).
137. Berger, supra note 19, at 553.
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Torts, et cetera, are the real "stuff" of the law. This of course is precisely not the intention of the reformers.
Quite typically, by using this cautious approach, all Columbia could
achieve, despite a major effort, was a cutting of the credit hours in the
traditional courses and the addition of courses and course segments
on Law and Economics, Foundations of a Regulatory State, and Per39
spectives on Legal Thought. 13 Tennessee achieved even less.
Jay Feinman, a progressive teacher at Rutgers-Camden, offers some
valuable insight on such piecemeal reforms:
Often the degree of change in the life of the institution or in the real
learning of its students is not as great as the glorious language of the
documents promoting change would suggest. Innovation, like
sameness, can have a routine quality that suggests detachment and
formula rather than engagement .... Change is hard because of the
law of inertia. Once things have been done one way, it requires
energy to get them going in a different direction."4
This is why Feinman states, in a sentiment I would echo, "Reforms
like these will be most successful when they embody the intense personal involvement of the participants in the change.' ' 4' If this is present, institutionalization of the change becomes possible.
Institutionalization, Feinman points out, is difficult in part because of
hubris: "We law professors have a high opinion of ourselves.' 14 On
the other hand, institutionalization of changes is made easier because
inertia is a property of a body in motion as well as of a body at rest.
"Once a change has been instituted and repeated once or twice it [itself] acquires momentum.' '1 43 The surest way to make this occur, in
my view, is to propose an exciting paradigm-shift in law that engages
the dean and crucial members of the faculty, and provides them with
the innovative spirit and staying power necessary to implement and
institutionalize such a change.

138. See Revised Draft, supra note 19, at 1; see also COLUM3IA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
THE JuRIsDOCTOR PROGRAM 26 (1991).
139. Tennessee added a five-and-one-half day Introductory Period before the first year begins and a six-credit, two-semester course in Legal Process. See University of Tennessee College
of Law, Curriculum Revision Project (Summary) 2-5 (1987) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author); see also UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE COLLEGE OF LAW, 1991-92 BULLETIN (1991).
140. Feinman,supra note 16, at 510-11.
141. Id. at 510.
142. Id. at 511.
143. Id.
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VII.

UPPER-LEVEL COURSE FUNCTIONALIZATION

While not the chief focus of this Article, curriculum in the second
and third years of law school could be expected to shift in response to
functional integration of the first-year curriculum. I believe a tracking
system, such as that which is being systematically tried at George Mason University, 1 " would make the most sense.
While George Mason begins its various functional career tracks in
the first year,' 45 I see no reason not to delay this until the second and
third years. This would give every student a common conceptual firstyear core such as that I have suggested. The tracks currently existing
in George Mason's curriculum are "Banking and Financial Services,"
"Corporate and Securities Law," "Patent Law," and the "Standard
Program." Under development are "International Trade Law" and
"Real Estate Law" tracks. 14 Other possible tracks readily come to
mind such as "Public Service Law" and "Financial and Estate Planning." The point is that the law student participating in a curriculum
thus arranged will not only receive the common conceptual core I
have suggested for the first year, but can become familiar with all the
subjects necessary to practice in a specific area of law.
Of particular importance in designing such an upper-level curriculum is the functional integration of doctrine in each of its constituent
courses. For example in the "Financial and Estate Planning" track I
have suggested, tax and regulatory aspects of estates and trusts law
should be interrelated with traditional common law aspects. This has
been tried off and on at various schools. One successful example was
Professor James Casner's Estate Planning course at Harvard, which
taught tax and regulation alongside common law doctrine.' 47 This
course, however, died along with Professor Casner, and the Harvard
curriculum has returned to the more common separation of "Wills,
Estates, and Trusts" from "Estate and Gift Tax" and "Estate Plan-

ning."

1
4

One reason for this return to old ways was suggested in a letter to
me from Professor Lawrence Waggoner of Michigan.' 49 Trying to
functionalize Estates and Trusts law in an otherwise standard curriculum at Michigan provoked student protest, leading to eventual aban-

144.

See generally GEORGE MASON UNrVERSITY LAW SCHOOL CATALOGUE, 1991-1992 (1991).

145. Id.
146.

See id. at 2-3.

147.

See generally A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE Pt~mNiNG (4th ed. 1980).

148.

See, e.g., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 1990-91 CATALOG (1990). The catalog shows only a

two-credit Estate Planning course, but does not even list a basic Trusts and Estates course. Id.at
113.

149. See Letter from Lawrence W. Waggoner, Professor of Law, University of Michigan, to
the author (Dec. 1991) (on file with author).
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donment of the experiment. The key, of course, is to make such
functionally-integrated courses the norm rather than the exception in
a curriculum. An excellent way to do this would, it seems to me, be to
institute a tracking system for all students. They would then expect a
particular course within a given track to treat all the elements necessary for a lawyer to deal with that subject, rather than to make an
artificial separation of common law doctrine from the rest of what he
or she needed to know.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Functionalizing legal doctrine should be a primary goal in any substantial revision of the first-year curriculum. Because many rules and
doctrines presently discussed in one first-year course serve the same or
a similar function as those in another such course, basic conceptual
training in the first year should be organized according to the unifying
principles these underlying functions reveal. Using such cross-cutting
principles, the present courses of Torts, Contracts, and Property
could be taught under the rubric "Civil Obligation." Since many of
these principles reappear in Criminal Law, it might well be possible to
teach the substance of this course in addition to the other three, under
the more general heading of "Legal Obligation." Also, Criminal and
Civil Procedure, when functionalized, could appear merely as "Procedure."
The benefits of such changes would include the elimination of redundancy and the de-mystification of legal doctrine itself. Not only
would students be better able to connect the pieces of their learning,
but they would be taught to approach problems in ways closer to
those employed by experienced practitioners. Time would also be
freed up in the first year to deal with statutes and regulations in the
Obligation and Procedure courses, and perhaps to add courses like
Administrative Law, in which statutory and regulatory law are already
treated as paramount. As students move into upper-level courses,
functionalization of doctrine would give way to functionalization by
task. This could be accomplished in courses like New England's teamtaught "Practicing Business Law," which ideally would be placed
within a tracking system, giving students different majors, as does the
program at George Mason.
As I have noted here and in the previous article, there have already
been several notable attempts to make such a paradigm-shift in the
ways students learn law. Earliest and most far-reaching was the failed
attempt of Laswell and McDougal at Yale during World War II to
transform law school training into policy science. Another sweeping
change was the functionalized curriculum initiated by the new law
school at CUNY-Queens during the 1980s. This curriculum, as I
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noted, has recently been modified due to low bar pass rates and "publish-or-perish" pressures.
A much less ambitious attempt at Harvard during the 1980s to provide bridges between traditional first-year courses collapsed in 1991
after almost a decade of experimentation. However, the venture was
picked up and greatly expanded by Georgetown, whose fall 1991 curriculum contained an experimental first-year section completely devoid of courses with traditional names such as Contracts and Torts.
The Georgetown experiment now appears to be the most promising
vehicle for practical application of the sort of changes I propose. For
the most part, Georgetown has tried to be politically careful in both
the planning and implementation of its experimental program.
I have outlined these and other political steps that schools which
attempt major changes in curriculum should follow. While I recognize
the need for pragmatism such as Georgetown has employed, I also
believe that even Georgetown's program may lack the "glue" that a
set of organizing principles like mine would provide. With the backing
of such principles, an experiment such as Georgetown's can be given
greater focus and permanence.

